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A STUDY OF DIVIDED JURISDICTION OVER PHYSICAL
STANDARDS FOR AIRMEN UNDER THE
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT OF 1938
By 'STANLEY J. ARONOFF AND DAVID A. TALMAN
Harvard Law School
INTRODUCTION
O N February 29, 1956, CAB' Draft Release 56-62 was distributed to
all interested segments in civil aviation. This notice proposed to
liberalize existing regulations with regard to physical standards for
pilots. 3 Coming at a time when present rule-making procedures were
being questioned,4 it elicited a great deal of comment. From the welter
of conflicting opinion, one conclusion is justified, namely, whether or
not 56-6 is ultimately approved or disapproved, a review of government
regulation in this area is in order.
The authors will not attempt to pass on the merits either of Draft
Release 56-6, or of the present standards. Rather, the purpose of this
paper is to examine the governmental procedure which collects avail-
able data regarding physical standards and balances competing policies
in behalf of the broad public interest.
In order to approach the problem most logically, the authors have
devoted chapter I to an outline of the present regulatory scheme.
Chapter II contains a critique of deficiencies in present rule-making
procedure and suggestions for improvement. Chapter III discusses
problem areas in the enforcement of Physical Standards regulations.
The authors hope that suggestions made in this paper will be
helpful to those most vitally concerned with medico-legal problems in
civil aviation.
I. ANCESTRY AND OPERATION OF CURRENT
REGULATION OF PHYSICAL STANDARDS
FOR AIRMEN
No full discussion of current medico-legal problems in air safety
is possible without some knowledge of the government regulatory
program. The purpose of this chapter is to give a skeletal history and
1 Civil Aeronautics Board.
2 21 F.R. 1326.
3 The release also proposes stricter standards in that it proposes to make
disqualifying the probable presence of coronary heart disease, diabetes requiring
insulin, epilepsy, or psychosis. See sec. 29.2 (4) c, 29.3 (4) c, 29.4 (2) c.
4 See e.g. Stovall, "Federal Concern with Civil Aviation Medicine," Feb. 18,
1955; Priest, "Research in Civil Aviation Medicine," Cong. Rec. Apr. 19, 1955;
Magnuson, "Address to Airline Medical Examiners Association," Cong. Rec. Apr.
5, 1954.
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outline of the present statute as it affects physical standards. Only a
factual exposition will be presented here, all criticisms and suggestions
being reserved to later chapters.
HISTORY LEADING TO THE 1938 ACT
Early evidence of public concern with air safety can be found in
pre-1920 legislation.' Prior to that date, eight states and Hawaii had
adopted flight regulations requiring registration of pilots and aircraft,
and prescribing air traffic rules. The nature of aviation, however, soon
crystallized the need for a more unified approach.2 Inevitable Federal
legislation was enacted in 19263 under the authority of the Commerce
Clause. 4 For the first time, physical standards for airmen were intro-
duced by Federal regulations. 5 Although the 1926 act was supplanted
by subsequent legislation, the physical standards have remained sub-
stantially unchanged.6
A satisfactory degree of uniformity did not result even under the
1926 act because a provision for state cooperation in enforcement of
the regulations had been stricken from the act, and because its defini-
tions section seemed to exclude intrastate flight.7 Further study8 led
to the adoption of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1928, 9 which, as
amended by Reorganization Plans III and IV' ° is presently in effect.
Cases decided under this act indicate that power to regulate air safety
is exclusively federal."
1 Black, Uniformity in Air Safety Regulation; Cooperative Federalism Applied,
15 J. Air L. & Com. 181 (1948).
2 See e.g., Cal. Stat. § 1421 (1921) which provides that its aviation regulations
shall be void wherever a jurisdictional conflict with federal acts exists. The same
principle underlies the adoption in 1922 of the Uniform Aeronautics Act by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Ten states adopted
the act by 1926.
3 Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 569, 48 Stat. 1113, 49 U.S.C. 173.
4 U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8.
5 14 C.F.R. 20.104, 20.124, 20.134, 20.34.
3 Compare C.A.R., 29.1 et seq. and 43.1 et seq. with Note 5, supra.
7 Black, supra at 183. The point is made that many state institutions banned
incorporation of federal standards by reference, and it was doubtful in those states
that the state aeronautics officer would be a "rubber stamp" for federal standards.
8 Report of the Federal Aviation Commission, Jan. 30, 1935.
9 52 Stat. § 73 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 401.
10 Under Reorganization Plans III and IV, as of June 30, 1940, the CAA and
CAB were made separate entities. The reasons for the division appear in H.R. Doc.
No. 681 and 692, 76th Congress, 3d Session.
11 See e.g. Northwest Airlines vs. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944); Causby
et ux vs. United States, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
However the need for state cooperation in the enforcement of these regulations
has been recognized by CAA Safety Enforcement Guide (1947), and Rathje, Con-
stitutionality of State and Municipal Air Traffic Control, 15 J. Air Law & Com.
108 (1948). There is adequate precedent for a greater delegation of authority for
enforcement of federal law by state agencies, if desired. See U. S. vs. Bailey, 9
Pet. (U.S.) 238. A state court has already been held obliged to enforce penalties
provided by the Federal Act. Testa vs. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1946).
The arguments against a greater delegation to state agencies are as follows:
that it will be impractical for state enforcement officers to keep abreast of Civil
Air Regulations, that the level of enforcement will vary from state to state, and
that a high level of enforcement in one state will not be adequate protection for
itself against the unsafe practices of neighboring states.
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DUAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE PRESENT ACT
Two separate agencies, the CAB and CAA are required by law to
deal with the regulation of air safety. The former is the rule promul-
gator and quasi judicial body; the latter is the enforcer and imple-
menter.
Legislative jurisdiction of the CAB is delineated in the section of
the act which provides:
"The Board is empowered and it shall be its duty to promote
safety of flight in air commerce by prescribing and revising from
time to time ... 6) such reasonable rules and regulations or mini-
mum standards governing practices, methods, and procedures, as
the Board may find necessary to provide adequately for safety in
air commerce."'12
In practice, initial responsibility for rule promulgation rests upon
the Bureau of Safety Regulation, a subdivision of the CAB. 13 Any
draft release proposing to revise current physical standards for airmen
originates here.14 After notice is sent out, a reasonable time is given
for comments and hearings. 15 The Board then either adopts the pro-
posal, amends it, or rejects it.16
The act also provides that every pilot possess a certificate denoting
that he is "physically able to perform the duties pertaining to the
position for which the airman certificate is sought."'1- Responsibility
for administering the certification and recertification' 8 procedures is
entrusted to the Medical Division of the CAA.19 There are presently
three classes of airman certificates: airline transport (Class I), com-
mercial (Class II), and private (Class III) .20 A Class I certificate
entitles the holder to carry passengers for hire in instrument flight
conditions21 in an aircraft of any weight.22 The physical requirements
of this class are the most rigorous of the three,23 and the renewal period
12 52 Stat. 1007 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 551(a).
13 Interview, Mr. Bert Shields, CAB Bureau of Safety Regulation, Dec. 28,
1956. Mr. Shields explained that the functions of the Bureau with regard to physical
standards are as follows: to keep records of air crashes, to coordinate all data
obtained by it and other offices concerning human factors in air safety, to use this
information in proposing appropriate standards, and to gather comment on its
proposals for the consideration of the Board.
14 See e.g., C.A.R. Draft Release 56-6.
15 Administrative Procedure Act § 4(a), (b), 60 Stat. 240 (1946).
16 See Note 12, supra.
17 Civil Aeronautics Act (1938) § 602(b), 49 U.S.C. 552 (b).
18 49 U.S.C. 552 (b) provides that the Administrator may limit the duration of
any airman certificate.
19 See Part 650, § 6(4), 11 F.R. 177A, 13 F.R. 3045, 13 F.R. 9313, 14 F.R.
1303, 16 F.R. 2975, 19 F.R. 2975, 21 F.R. 7027. The Medical Division is one of
several divisions that comprise the Office of Aviation Safety. It is the only medical
group within the Federal Government directly responsible for the physical fitness
of airmen. The staff of the Medical Division is composed of a chief, Dr. W. R.
Stovall, two physicians, a physiologist, a psychologist, a physicist, and a biometri-
cian. There are nine regional offices, each staffed by a medical officer and from one
to three clerical assistants. There is an aeronautical center at Oklahoma City where




23 Compare C.A.R. 29.2 with C.A.R. 29.3 and 29.4.
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for medical certification is six months.2 4 The commercial and private
pilot privileges are respectively more limited,2 5 and the physical stand-
ards26 and renewal periods are less strict.27
IMPACT OF THE REGULATORY MACHINERY ON THE APPLICANT
Perhaps the best way to understand the practical operation of the
administrative program is to trace the steps a pilot must follow in order
to be permitted to fly.
Suppose Joe Pilot, who has had considerable flying experience,
desires to become an airline transport pilot. He has successfully com-
pleted a training course with a large airline, and now applies for a
Class I certificate. Joe would be given a list of "designated medical
examiners in the area in which he lives and would make an appoint-
ment to see one of his choice.28 It is the examiner's duty to decide
whether Joe meets the physical standards for certification.
To assist him in this determination, the "designee" is furnished a
Guide for Medical Examiners which gives the CAA interpretations of
physical standards, and lists instructions on how to carry them out.2 9
He is also equipped with examination forms which Joe is required to
answer to the best of his knowledge.80 In actual practice only a mini-
mum of supervision of the designee is possible. Thus a great part of
the success of the examination rests upon the competence of the doctor,
and the seriousness with which he takes his duty.8'
A successful "physical," however, is also dependent upon Joe's
willingness to cooperate. He is expected to give a complete and honest
account of his medical history so that the doctor can accurately diagnose
whether or not he has a disqualifying condition.32 Unfortunately, not
every pilot is willing to give full disclosure, especially if he thinks he
24 C.A.R. 43.41 (c).
25 Compare 43.60 and 43.61 with 43.62.
26 See Note 23, supra.
27 Compare C.A.R. 43.41 (c) and 43.41(b) with 43.41(a).
28 A designated examiner (designee) is one appointed by the Medical Division
to give Class I and Class II certification examinations. He is chosen because of his
qualifications and specialized training. Authority to appoint Medical Designees is
derived from Civil Aeronautics Act § 602(b), 49 U.S.C. 552. The usual charge for
a Class I examination is $15.00.
29 The Guide for Medical Examiners is but one of many Manuals of Procedure
published by the CAA. The purpose is to give designees in the chain of command a
consolidated list of instructions necessary to accomplish the technical phases of
the Administrators Safety Program.
30 This form is called Report of Airman Medical Examination. There is one
for each class of certificate. The newest form is patterned after an insurance appli-
cation, the pilot being reminded of the penalty for withholding or misrepresenting
his medical history.
31 In the Committee Proceedings of the President's Health Resources Advisory
Committee, Mar. 28, 1952, p. 37, Dr. Stovall expressed confidence in the examiners
designated to give Class I and Class II examinations. For the most part they are
military-trained people. Many have served as designees for several years so that
they have become trained in this specialty.
32 Dr. Stovall, Problems of Medical Certification and Recertification Procedures,
CAA Medical Division, August 30, 1956, p. 4.
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has a defect that would or could cause a denial of certification. Regard-
ing flying as his "life's work," he will go to great lengths to obtain a
medical clearance, whether or not entitled to it.13 The result is that
the examiner is usually able to pick out "structural defects"34 which
are readily detectable, but may pass over "latent defects"33 which are
more easily concealed unless the applicant aids him. An attempt to
achieve more adequate screening has been made by the issuance of
new medical report forms designed to pin-point areas of disability.,,
Yet, in the final analysis, the effectiveness of the examination still
remains, at least to some degree, within the control of the pilot.
If Joe were applying for a Class II or Class III certificate, the
procedure would be substantially the same except that, as pointed out
above, the standards he would have to meet would be lower. There is,
however, one difference worth mentioning. Class I and Class II exam-
iners are specially designated by the CAA Medical Division. On the
other hand, any licensed physician, including Joe's own family doctor,
may give the Class III, private pilot exam.37
Suppose, in the opinion of the examiner, Joe qualifies for the
Class I certificate he is seeking. The doctor will issue to Joe a medical
certificate,88 and will forward a written report39 of the exam to the
regional CAA office for review. If the findings are satisfactory, no
further action is taken. But if the Regional Medical Officer believes
that the certificate was improperly issued, it will be recovered, and its
reissuance will depend upon the results of further examination.4 0
In the event that the examiner finds that Joe has not met the cer-
tification requirements, Joe may nevertheless be eligible to fly on a
"waiver" if he can demonstrate by his "operational record, ability, and
judgment as an airman," that he can "compensate for his physical
33 Dr. Stovall, in his report to Health Resources Advisory Committee, supra,
p. 38, explains the basis for this conclusion: He said, "We know that we have a
lot of people flying who should not be flying because our tabulations of medical
conditions reported is far below those of the total population, and far below those
we would expect in the pilot group, though we don't have accurate figures for that
particular group."
34 Guide for Medical Examiners, Para. 33. A structural defect is one that is
relatively static, that can be measured, and is not due to active disease. The follow-
ing are included: diminished vision, diplopia and strabismus, deficient depth
perception, defective hearing, spinal curvature and ankylosis, amputation, mal-
formation, and atrophies.
35 Interview, Dr. W. R. Stovall, Dec. 27, 1956. A latent defect is a passive
deficiency that periodically "flares up" and incapacitates the pilot. Epilepsy,
diabetes, certain cardiac conditions, and venereal disease are examples. Since there
are stretches when the defect lies dormant and the pilot appears perfectly normal,
a latent deficiency is easily concealed unless an accurate history is ascertained.
36 See new Medical Report Form, CAA, 1957.
37 14 C.F.R. 406.12 (C)2.
38 C.A.R. § 43.41.
839 14 C.F.R. 406.11(b).
40 It is not clear from the relevant statutory material whether the designee
acts as a licensing agent or is merely authorized to express an opinion on which
the CAA relies. Regardless of the designee's function, the CAA retains review
power over the designee's acts.
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deficiency." 41 If Joe has only a "structural defect," 42 it is quite possible
that he will be certified, subject to such limitations as may be necessary.
Suppose Joe is found to have a disqualifying "organic disease, "43
and his application for a certificate is rejected by the CAA Regional
Medical Officer.44 Joe still has one more string to his bow-the right
of appeal to the CAB. Upon filing with the CAB a petition for recon-
sideration, Joe is assigned a hearing at a place convenient to his resi-
dence or employment.4  On the date set, his case is heard by a trial
examiner 46 of the CAB who acts much like a judge in a civil court.
Counsel for the CAA explains why the certificate was refused, and often
utilizes expert medical testimony to substantiate the basis for the
denial. Joe may counter by calling his own specialist to refute the
previous testimony.47 After all the medical evidence is heard, the trial
examiner renders a decision as to whether the requirements of the
particular standard in question have been met. A number of reversals
in favor of the applicant have been obtained in this manner.48 The
decision of the examiner may be reviewed by the Board, on the record,
but without further oral argument.49 If the Board differs with the
findings of the examiner, its conclusion will prevail.50 Even if the
examiner acted properly, the Board may mitigate the applicable stand-
ards by exercising its regulatory power, although the certificate thus
41 C.A.R. § 29.5.
Dr. Stovall in Problems of Medical Certification and Recertification Procedures,
supra, describes the policy behind waiver as "the recognition that some form of
flexibility is necessary for an equitable application of physical standards." The
reasons are as follows:
a. The line of demarcation between the safe and unsafe physical standard is
difficult to establish.
b. There is a great variation in the ability of persons to compensate for
physical defects.
c. There is a lack of uniformity in the assessment and reporting of physical
findings.
d. There is continuous fluctuation in the applicant's physical condition above
and below the level for disqualification.
Dr. Stovall further states that it is easier to acquire a Class III waiver than
a Class I or II waiver. The examiner merely notes the defect on the Class III
applicant's report. The pilot then goes to a flight examiner who decides if he is
entitled to fly on waiver after a flight test. On the other hand, Class I and Class II
waiver applications are carefully scrutinized and reviewed by the Regional Medical
Officer to determine whether the defect is static or whether there is actually a
disease in progress.
42 See Note 34, supra, for definition of "structural defect." The Medical Divi-
sion has determined that a waiver should only be issued for "structural defects that
are not too severe or progressive, and are not due to active disease." Guide for
Medical Examiners, Para. 33.
43 The CAA Medical Division has determined that "progressive mental, nerv-
ous, or organic disease cannot be compensated" so as to permit waiver. Guide for
Medical Examiners. Para. 33.
44 See C.A.R. 29.2 which prohibits certification if the applicant has "... organic
or functional disease which would interfere with the safe piloting of aircraft."
45 Civil Aeronautics Act § 602 (b), 49 U.S.C. 552.
46 Administrative Procedure Act, supra, §§ 2(e), 5, 7 and 8. All the present
CAB trial examiners are lawyers. All but one have pilot's licenses. Interview,
Francis Brown, Chief Examiner CAB, Dec. 28, 1956.
47 Interview, Sydney Schneider, CAA Deputy Chief Enforcement and Litiga-
tion, Dec. 28, 1956.
48 See e.g., CAB Docket 3753, June 15, 1945.
49 Administrative Procedure Act, supra, § 7 (b).
50 Civil Aeronautics Act § 1006(e), 49 U.S.C. 646.
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issued may grant only limited privileges. In case of an adverse ruling,
Joe may appeal to any court of competent jurisdiction, though he
would be setting a precedent if he availed himself of this right.51
Finally, let us assume that Joe is involved in an air crash. Respon-
sibility for accident investigation is vested in the CAB through a
subdivision, the Bureau of Safety Investigation. 52 Although the Bureau
delegates to the CAA investigatory jurisdiction over accidents of air-
craft under 12,500 lbs., it retains jurisdiction over the larger accidents,
or where "probable cause" is not apparent.53 An investigator-in-charge
is appointed, specialists are sent to the scene, and public hearings are
held in which all interested groups may participate.5 4 Information
collected by this bureau is communicated to the Bureau of Safety
Regulation for use in rule promulgation. 55 Any aircraft that is dam-
aged must have its air-worthiness certificate renewed after repair. 56
If Joe is injured seriously to disqualify him for certification, it is unlaw-
ful for him to pilot an aircraft until he again meets the appropriate
physical requirements. 57
51 Administrative Procedure Act, § 10(a).
52 The Board's investigatory power can be found in § 1002(e) of the Act
(49 U.S.C. 642).
53 The Administrator's investigatory power when the duty is delegated can be
found in § 309 of the Act (49 U.S.C. 458).
54 Power to hold hearings, etc., can be found in § 1004 of the Act (49 U.S.C.641). 55 Interview, Mr. Tanguay, Bureau of Safety Investigation, Dec. 28, 1956.
56 C.F.R. 43.20, 43.21-1.
57 14 C.F.R. 43.42.
II. CRITIQUE OF PRESENT RULE PROMULGATION
Having outlined the present regulatory procedure, it is now appro-
priate to inquire whether it is well adapted to accomplishing its pur-
pose. This chapter will concentrate on the promulgation of physical
standards, from the research used to justify such regulations, to the
drafting of the requirements into law. Finally, proposals will be made
regarding who should be entrusted with rule-making in this area.
LACK OF ADEQUATE RESEARCH
The most elementary problem, but the most difficult and expensive
one to cure, is the lack of authoritative medical research concerning
physical standards.' One explanation for this deficiency is that the Act
does not specifically require that regulations be based on scientific
testing. Such a requisite can easily be implied, however, from the
provision for "reasonable" standards, from the stress on accident
investigation, and from the emphasis on communication of data
1 As this chapter was being written, it was announced that the Daniel and
Florence Guggenheim Foundation had granted $250,000 for the creation of the
Harvard Guggenheim Center for Aviation Health and Safety, with Dr. Ross
McFarland as Technical Director. N. Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1957. p. 29, Col. 2.
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between agencies and departments within agencies. Furthermore, the
CAB has been satisfied to rely on ancillary research.
1. Historical Reliance on Military Research
Historically, civil air regulation has always relied on military studies
and standards. When the original civil airman standards were intro-
duced in 1926,2 they were basically echoes of the prevailing military
rules.3 Yet, while military research has progressed to a point where
four days of testing are required for the Air Force applicant, 4 no sig-
nificant changes have occurred in civil air regulations.5 Thus, whatever
justification the Board might previously have had for relying on mili-
tary standards has been lost by its failure to keep abreast of changes
in military regulation, testing and research.
2. Airlines Impose their own "Physicals"
Understandably, the larger airlines began to organize their own
medical departments in the late 1930's.6 Members of these departments
in turn formed the A.M.D.A.7 to facilitate the transmission of medical
information bearing on flight personnel selection and longevity.8 The
flight "physicals" given by airline doctors are more extensive than those
required by the Civil Air Regulations." They include laboratory
studies of the heart, chest, blood and urine.""
3. Majority View: Such "Physicals" Increase Safety
The fact that life insurance benefits are generally payable where
death of the insured arises out of scheduled airline operations, but are
not payable where death arises out of non-scheduled or private flying,"
also tends to bear out an assertion that scheduled airline flying is safer
than other flying. That deduction in turn supports the idea that
A.M.D.A. "physicals," superadded to the higher CAB standards for
Class I certification, do in fact increase relative safety. The degree of
correlation between physical fitness and accident control, however,
remains unclear at this time.
4. Draft Release 56-6-Research Vacuum Spotlighted
The dilemma produced by the lack of research data is dramatized
by the current debate over physical standards, elicited by the distribu-
tion of CAB Draft Release 56-6. Since this release proposes to liberalize
2 See Note 6, Chapter II.
3McFarland, Human Factors in Air Transportation, p. 88 (1st ed. 1953).
4 Id. at 44.
5 See Note 6, Chapter II.6 McFarland, Op. cit., p. 88.
7 Airlines Medical Directors Association.
s Interview, Dr. L. G. Lederer, Chairman, Medical Committee, Air Transport
Association (A.T.A.), Dec. 27, 1956.
9 See Formal Letter from Milton Arnold, Vice President, Operations and Engi-
neering, A.T.A., to John Chamberlain, Bureau of Safety Reg., CAB, June 7, 1956.
10 McFarland, Op. cit., p. 89.
"See Specimen Ordinary Life Policy in Patterson, Cases of Insurance (3d ed.
1955) p. 805.
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present standards, it has provoked a mass of medical response con-
demning any such revision downward. One of the chief spokesmen
for the doctors is the C.A.M.A., 12 an organization comprised mainly of
CAA designees, most of whom have dealt with physical characteristics
and flying for many years. In voicing its disapproval the C.A.M.A. has
been forced to rely heavily on "opinion" and "accumulated experience"
rather than authoritative scientific data.'8
On the other hand, the alleged 14 scientific bases15 of supporting
the proposed changes are themselves subject to criticism by the
C.A.M.A. on the grounds of probable inaccuracy and invalidity.16
Such criticism merely throws the whole subject back into a no-man's
land, with resolution dependent upon more reliable evidence.
5. Further Hints from the Army: Psychological Testing
The armed services have developed useful psychological tests. For
example, in 1941, the Air Force devised the A.A.F. Qualifying Test
which was found to be of considerable predictive value in selecting
combat pilots.' 7 Failure rate' 8 among selected applicants could be
reduced from 75% to 36% if such tests were employed. By contrast,
only the most rudimentary psychological information is required by
civil air regulations.' 9
Airlines have occasionally used psychological examinations in
selection of pilots. The more usual practice, however, is to rely on
educational background, flying experience, flight checks, and personal
interviews.20 This approach leaves unanswered the problems of inter-
est and temperament for airline piloting, as well as questions of
judgment and skill under stress of routine or adverse flying condi-
12 Civil Aviation Medical Association.
18 See Letter from Joel Fisher, Counsel for C.A.M.A., to John Chamberlain,
Bureau of Safety Regulation, published in Contact, Sept. 4, 1956, p. 12, col. 4.
14 C.A.R. Draft Release 56-6, 21 F.R. 1326.
15 The CAB listed two studies supporting greater leniency. First, it pointed
out that the Franzen and Frimhall study, The Relation of Accidents to Physical
Defects Noted in Standard CAA Medical Examinations, Report 3, Division of
Research, CAA, July 1942, uncovered no significant relationship between noted
physical defects and aircraft accidents. Second, it pointed out that the I.C.A.O.
standards governing international flight are less strict in numerous particulars
than CAB standards, and nevertheless have been accepted by the U. S. These
standards are set out in International Standards and Recommended Practices;
Personal Licensing, Annex I to the Convention on International Civil Aviation
(3d ed. April, 1953, as amended, July, 1956). Finally, the CAB pointed to the small
number of disqualifications under present rules, especially for men under 40, asjustification for more lenient renewal requirements.
16 See Bruyere, Proceedings of the C.A.M.A., Chicago, Ill., April 16, 1956,
p. 49 et. seq.
17 McFarland, Op. cit., p. 42. To assist in making differential selection for the
various flight crew duties, the Air Force also developed a series of tests measuring
expressed interests, specialized aptitudes and abilities. The tests bore out previous
theories regarding the human characteristics requisite to military flying. The tests
were expanded in complexity by the Pilot Candidate Selection Research Program
in 1947, but follow up studies measuring failure rates, accidents, instructors
ratings and amount of extra time needed to complete the training program are not
yet available. (See McFarland, Op. cit. p. 44.)
18 Failure rate refers to the percentage of applicants who did not successfully
complete the military flight training program.
19 C.A.R. 29.3c.
20 McFarland, op. cit. p. 45.
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tions.2 1 The high turnover rate among pilots,22 despite high wage
scales, tends to support the notion that airline testing procedures are
inadequate.
Even if airline psychological screening were perfected, the whole
area of private and commercial piloting would remain unrestricted.
Such an omission would leave the situation as it is now-dependent
upon the discretion and ability of examining doctors. These doctors
are doctors of medicine, not psychology, many of whom are untrained
in aviation medicine. The result of this practice is that psychological
information is obtained in a hit-or-miss fashion. 23
The authors believe that the CAB should follow the example of
the Air Force, by devising appropriate psychological tests for civilian
piloting. These tests should be applied to every class of pilot, although
with increasing leniency towards commercial and private pilots. Such
a program could only be properly administered by a government
agency such as the CAA along the same lines as present CAA physical
examinations.
6. Present Status of Physiological Research
Assuming adequate psychological testing were devised, the problem
of physiological standards would remain at large. The skimpy research
presently available gives conflicting implications regarding the rela-
tionship between physical defect and accident. At least two inde-
pendent studies tend to support the Franzen and Brimhal 24 conclusions
which gave rise to Draft Release 56-6.25
On the other hand, physiological factors are the most logical
explanation of certain isolated deaths and near accidents in aircraft
operations.2 6 In addition, physiological tests have helped in selecting
21 Ibid.
22 According to McFarland, op. cit. p. 46, the number of .pilots who were
separated from one airline was roughly ten times the number who died, transferred,
or were grounded.
23 For a clever and conscientious approach to obtaining psychological informa-
tion about an applicant, see Address by William B. Smith, M.D., Chief Flight
Surgeon, St. of Conn. Dept. of Aeronautics to Aero-Medical Association, March 29,
1954, Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U. S.
Senate, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. on S2647.
24 See Note 15, Chapter II.
25 One such study tested substandard PAA-Air Ferry Pilots hired in 1942,
where no causal relationship between defect and accident was found. See McFar-
land, op. cit., p. 90. The second was a study of Lockheed test pilots, where the
number of defects averaged 3 to 5 per person. The number of accidents averaged
less than 4 per year, of which only 1.4 was fatal during the five years tested. This
was a surprisingly low figure considering the nature and extent of the flying opera-
tions. Furthermore, no causal relationship could be established between defects and
those accidents which occurred. See McFarland, op. cit., p. 90.
26 McCann, "The Role of the Medical Examiner in Aircraft Accident Investiga-
tions," paper prepared for Flight Safety Foundation Seminar, Santa Fe, New
Mexico, Nov. 10-12, 1956, pp. 6, 7. It is believed that the limited nature of such
data can be attributed more to the lack of proper investigation of pilots involved
in accidents than to the lack of a strong relationship between physical defect and
accident. This belief is found on statistics indicating that "pilot error" is responsible
for as high as 85 per cent of non-scheduled and private airplane crashes. "Pilot
error" includes errors of judgment, however, having perhaps no relation to physical
defect, and provides the explanation when cause of crash cannot otherwise be
determined.
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the physical types best adapted to high altitude flying 7 and similar
tests are believed useful in predicting longevity of pilot service.28 It
is hoped that the Flight Safety Foundation job analysis will provide
valuable information as to the correllation between physical defect
and accident.29
Further research can be expected from universities, aeronautical
institutions, and government sponsored programs.30 Such informal
research, however, is generally regarded as inadequate and undirected.
Legislation aimed at providing a more substantial government research
program has been introduced in the past 31 and recently reintroduced 2
as the "Civil Aviation Medical Act." This act proposes to establish a
"Civil Aeronautics Medical Research Laboratory'"'3 and authorizes
a "Civil Air Surgeon" to
"conduct ... research . . . relating to the causes, diagnosis, control
and prevention of physical and mental conditions .. . of civil airmen
that might adversely affect safety in air commerce; ... and to the
medical causes of accidents in air commerce. '3 4
The act also authorizes research fellowships,85 and the participation
of medical personnel in accident investigations, including autopsies
where indicated.36 Finally, the civil air surgeon is empowered to make
27 Keys, Mathews, Forbes, and McFarland, "Individual Variations in Ability
to Acclimatize to High Altitudes," Proc. Ray. Soc. (London), S.B. No. 842,
126:1-29, 1938. Variations in basal pulse rate, blood oxygen capacity, and alveolar
oxygen tension were some of the factors considered. Basal pulse rate is the rate
of heart beat taken after six or seven hours of rest and before eating. Within
certain limits, the lower the pulse, the greater the likelihood of good acclimation.
Blood oxygen capacity refers to the ability of blood to carry oxygen from the lungs
to needed areas in the body. Generally the greater this capacity, the greater the
chance of good acclimation. Alveolar oxygen tension refers to the action of exchange
of carbon dioxide for oxygen taking place at the capillaries of the alveoli (air cells)
of the lung. The higher the tension, generally, the better the acclimation.
28 McFarland, op. cit., p. 103.
29 The study may also explode a few myths regarding physical standards.
Proof that such myths may exist in a time of such scientific enlightenment can be
found in the 56.6 recommendations for changes in hearing standards, with which
the C.A.M.A. agrees. Until somewhat recently, men who had defective hearing as
measured against a quiet background were regarded as relatively unsafe. But
against the reconstructed background of a cockpit, many of these men were found
to have equal or superior hearing and comprehension of radio signals. The pro-
posed standard will be more lenient for many pilots, yet will result in no com-
promise with safety. Such are the benefits of adequate research.
30 The aeronautical center in Oklahoma, and Ohio State University School of
Aviation Medicine both carry on continuous, although limited, standards research.
See Statement of Major General Harry Armstrong, President, Aero-Medical Asso-
ciation, Excerpts of Meeting with President's Health Resources Advisory Commit-
tee, Feb. 28, 1952, p. 7. The CAA has sponsored similar research. See Address by
W. R. Stovall, M.D., at the meeting of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, Jan.
29, 1953, Cong. Rec. Feb. 4, 1953. The studies to be carried on at the Harvard
Guggenheim Center for Aviation Health and Safety also should bear on physical
standards. See Note 1, Chapter II, supra.
31 H.R. 10228 and S3677.
32 On Feb. 4, 1957 the Act was reintroduced as S1045, H.R. 4275.
33 Civil Aviation Medical Act, sec. 1403 (a) 3.
34 Id., sec. 1407a.
35 Id., sec. 1407 (b) 3.
36 Id., sec. 1407(1)5. There would seem to be ample power in Congress to
require participants in aviation activities to submit to physical examinations under
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Autopsies present a
more serious problem however. One treatise states that power to hold inquests is
generally limited by state law to cases where death is believed causd by violent or
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grants-in-aid to universities [etc.] for such research projects as are
recommended by the Federal Advisory Council on Civil Aviation
MedicineY7
The proposed legislation thus recognizes the need for continual
research in civil aviation medicine. The authors are wholeheartedly
in support of such a coordinated, long-term program. A great deal of
experimentation would be required in the early years to bring stand-
ards up to date. When that time arrives, physical standards research
can begin to probe ahead with technology, so that the man who flies
each revolutionary aircraft, will be the one who is best equipped to
do so, mentally and physically, within the limits of feasibility.
CRITIQUE OF THE PROMULGATION PROCEDURE
Assuming that an adequate research program can be established,
the next problem is how medical research data should be handled, that
is who should promulgate the rules regarding physical standards. This
question is now being debated in Washington mainly as a result of the
distribution of Draft Release 56-6. The controversy centers on whether
laymen or medical men should make the rules in this area.
1. Lack of Medical Representation in the CAB
Under the present system the CAB writes the regulations without
the assistance of medical personnel, although it employs skilled men
from other phases of science. Perhaps some justification for this omis-
sion is that the CAB may request assistance from the CAA Medical
Division when it deems it necessary.38 In practice, however, there has
been inadequate communication.
Another argument which has been used to justify the present
system is reference to the notice and hearing provisions of the A.P.A.89
It is urged that interested medical groups are invited to participate in
the hearings for proposed rules. Moreover, other interested groups
other unlawful means. The reason for this restriction is the well-guarded right to
decent burial and undisturbed sepulcre which can be asserted by the deceased's
next of kin. However, some jurisdictions extend the power to hold autopsies to
cases where death is caused by accidental means. 13 Am. Jur. 108. The result is
that few autopsies can be performed under existing law. However it is submitted
that Congress could cure the defect in a number of ways. First, it could make
violation of Civil Air Regulations a federal crime, and inquests of deaths suspected
to have arisen from C.A.R. violation would thus fall within the power of Congress
to execute federal criminal law. Second, it could rely on its broadening power under
the Commerce Clause to conduct inquests for the benefit of air safety. Third, it
could rely on its power to promote the general welfare of the United States. This
power is granted in Article 1, section 8, and in its terms seems to refer to taxation.
Authority to conduct autopsies might be argued to be a logical adjunct of taxation
for the public welfare.
37 Id., sec. 1408.
88 See Letter to Senator Bricker, chairman, Committee of Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, from S. G. Tipton, General Counsel, Air Transport Association
October 8, 1954, Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
U. S. Senate, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. on S2647, Revision Aeronautics Act, at p. 1277.
39 See Note 49, Chapter I.
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such as the A.L.P.A. 40 and A.O.P.A. 41 may also take part, bringing
their own technical and medical personnel. But this procedure cer-
tainly cannot be defended as the most scientific means of assuring
up-to-date legislation. It leaves the job of supplying medical informa-
tion to outsiders, many of whom have vested interests inconsistent with
public safety. Even if good medical advice is offered, the CAB has the
option, within reason, to ignore it.
In order to remedy the present void, and to prevent the repetition
of future draft releases not based on adequate medical counsel, the
authors propose that some form of medical representation be required
within the rule promulgating body. This gives rise to the question of
which agency-the CAB or the CAA-is best equipped to handle rule-
making in the area of physical standards. The case for each will be
stated below.
2. Alternative 1: Medical Representation on the CAB
A persuasive argument for retaining rule promulgation in the
CAB is that all civil aeronautics rule-making-traffic rules, plotting of
airlines, required equipment, prohibited maneuvers, as well as physical
standards-would flow from one central body. The coordination of
regulations in one area with those in another area is clearly easier
under such a plan.
Another argument is that decision-making power would remain in
the hands of persons trained to balance conflicting policies, and who
are, arguably at least, aloof from any one special interest. 42 Many
groups concerned with civil aviation such as the A.L.P.A., the A.O.P.A.
and the A.T.A. express the fear that their interest would be overlooked,
and the overall good of aviation would suffer, if physical standards
were left entirely in the jurisdiction of doctors. They argue that
doctors are not properly qualified as legislators.
43
Assuming that rule promulgation is retained by the CAB, the
authors propose that the act should require medical assistance in the
drafting of physical standards. At the very least, provision should be
made for consultation with specialists in the areas of proposed change.
It would also be advisable that a staff medical post be created within
40 The Airline Pilots Association is the union which represents airline pilots.
41 The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association represents private pilots and
owners of private aircraft. Its membership now numbers in excess of 60,000.
42 The members of the Board are appointed by the President of the United
States and are thus not directly subject to the vicissitudes of elections. The members
are, however, subject to the vicissitudes of Presidents, and to the pressures which
the President himself must face. The threat of forced resignation from the Board
is obviously a factor tending to work against the best performance of CAB duties.
But all executive appointee posts are subject to the same criticism, and there is no
practical way to cure the problem, since such procedure accords with our notions
of checks and balances in a democratic government. We can only hope that CAB
members will be appointed partly for their ability to carry out their honestly held
ideas about public safety, without undue regard to private pressures.
48 For views of interested groups in disapproval of delegation of rule-making
power to medical persons, Hearings Before Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, U. S. Senate, 83d Cong. 2d Sess., on S2647, Revision of Civil Aeronautics
Act. pp. 1273-81.
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the Bureau of Safety Regulation. While the CAB would retain final
decision-making power, the staff doctor would be available to assist in
interpreting physical standards research.44 Moreover, it would be his
duty to verbalize or edit physical standards regulation. Adoption of
such a procedure would result in closer communication between rule-
making and research.
3. Alternative 2: Delegation of Physical Standards Rule-Making
to the CAA
A second alternative would be for the Act to delegate to a medical
group within the CAA the whole jurisdiction over physical standard
setting. There are many advantages to such a delegation. First, there
would be less chance of misinterpretation of research data. Second,
the importance of proper physical standards- in civil aviation would
be given greater emphasis. Third, if medical, men set the standards,
they would probably be higher, since a doctor is more aware of the
risks of physical deficiencies than a layman. Finally, promulgation
and enforcement would be combined into one body, thus mitigating
present problems caused by dual interpretation.
On the other hand, there are also powerful arguments against such
a delegation-basically the same arguments that favor retention of
rule-making in the CAB. Coordination with regulations in other areas
is made more difficult; higher standards may work against the promo-
tion of civil aviation by making it available to fewer people; an 1
44 It is understood that even with adequate research, there will be much room
for doubt as to whether a given standard will result in the desired degree of safety.
It might well be argued that if the Board is left with power to make this determi-
nation, laymen will still be entrusted with the interpretation of medical data, a
duty for which doctors are better qualified.
To answer such an argument, it is necessary to break down the functions at
stake. The gathering of medical facts is a research job, and best performed by
trained medical men. On the other end of the process, the making of laws is a
legal job and generally best performed by legislators or those appointed to act aslegislators in a given field. In deciding what standard should result from given
medical facts, the function is one of mixed fact and law. In a court proceeding, a
question of mixed fact and law generally would be decided by a judge only where
the issue was so clear that reasonable men could not differ. In most other instances,
the jury, which is neither the fact gatherer nor standard setter, would decide.
There are no lay juries in administrative proceedings, and thus no "objective
bystanders" to decide what public safety requires in the area of physical standards.
The whole purpose of administrative tribunals is the development of expertness
with a view towards settling disputes and making rules more quickly and efficiently
than by way of civil trials and hearings before and studies by legislatures.
If there were only one type of expertness involved in the field of physical
standards, it would be easy to require that the experts in that field decide. Unfor-
tunately, in our case there are two forms of expertness involved, namely expertness
in the balancing of interests in civil aviation, and expertness in the interpretation
of medical research. In an analogous situation, rate-making for railroads in in-
terstate commerce, the experts in the broader field of public interest interpret
complicated data, which arguably might be better interpreted by professors of
mathematics or economics. The reason that this procedure is countenanced is that
the danger of fragmentation of policy responsibilities away from a single source
is regarded as a worse evil than errors of interpretation resulting from lack of
technical training in a highly specialized field. For the same reason, the authorsbelieve that, if the CAB is given the duty of defining safety generally, it must alsobe given the power to interpret medical data, regardless of the argument that
medical men may be better qualified.
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private interest groups, such as the A.L.P.A., A'.O.P.A, and A.T.A.,
would regard such a delegation as antagonistic to them.
Feeling that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, two sources
have suggested a delegation along the lines outlined above. Dr. Back-
enstoe, former President of the A.M.E.A. (now C.A.M.A.) proposed
to set up an office of civil aviation medicine whose power to set physical
standards would be commensurate with that of chief Flight Surgeons
of the U. S. Air Force and U. S. Navy.45 A second source is a bill
presently before Congress which was proposed by Senator Magnuson
and the late Congressman Priest.46 This act would specifically delegate
the power to set minimum physical standards to a Civil Air Surgeon 4 7
who would head an office of Civil Aviation Medicine in the CAA.
The authors feel that there is much merit to these proposals.
4. Conclusion
In summary, the authors feel certain that research in physical stand-
ards is long overdue. The authors further urge that medical assistance
in rule promulgation would be advisable. Either staffing the CAB
with medical representation, or an outright delegation of legislative
power to a CAA medical group would be an improvement from a
public safety point of view.
45 See Letter from Gerald A. Backenstoe, M.D., to Senator John Bricker,
chairman, Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, July 12, 1954,
Hearings before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U. S. Senate,
83d Cong. 2d Sess. on S2647.
46 H.R. 10228 and S3677.
47 Civil Aviation Medical Act of 1936, sec. 1405(1).
I1. PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT
The problem of who should promulgate physical standards for
airmen is, of course, intimately connected with the problem of how
well they are enforced. For no matter what standards are established
by the C.A.R.'s, they are only as good as their uniform and effective
implementation. The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the chief
problems caused by dual jurisdiction and interpretation, and to pro-
pose solutions consistent with those of the previous chapter with the
basic objective of a sound regulatory program for air safety.
THE NEED FOR STRICTER SUPERVISION OF PHYSICAL STANDARDS
In Chapter I it was shown that the CAA Medical Division is en-
trusted with the responsibility of enforcing the physical standards for
airmen, as set out in Part 29 of the Civil Air Regulations.' Although
the certification and recertification procedure was described, critical
evaluation was reserved for this chapter. Difficulties arising out of this
procedure will now be specifically discussed.
1 See p. 5, supra.
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Evidence is strong, that current regulations are not being strictly
enforced. The Medical Division annually reviews 160,000 reports of
physical examinations. Even though the incidence of disqualifying
disease and disability in the general population of flying age is 15%
to 25%, the overall denial rate for pilots is less than l%.2 In addition,
insurance claims and autopsy findings have revealed advance stages of
disease, whereas the pilot's medical records show him to be within
normal limits.3 Most alarming of all, perhaps, is the fact that 20% of
the airmen carry no form of medical certification whatsoever. 4 If
physical standards are necessary, and if a regulatory program is to be
successful, better implementation must be afforded at the examination
stage. Attention must be focused on the two prime participants-the
pilot and the examining doctor.
1. Disclosure by the applicant
As to the pilot, the problem of producing more effective enforce-
ment is one of encouraging the proper motivation. It has been said
that "the Airline Transport Pilot is one of the most examined human
beings in the world." 5 Not only must he pass the CAA physical require-
ments every six months, but if he works for a large airline he must also
pass the industry medical examination. 6 The latter is often more
stringent7 At each check-up he is faced with the same problem: if he
fails to meet the qualifications, he will be unable to act as a pilot. With
so much at stake, it is not hard to understand the pressures upon him
to pass at all costs. Safety and public health motivations may become
subordinated to the practical necessity of keeping a job.
It is not surprising, therefore, that pilots often resort to concealing
facts relevant to their medical history, rather than take the chance of
denial of certification. Furthermore, it would be naive to think this
problem can ever be wholly cured. Expanded use of the new Class III
"Report of Medical Examination" form, however, might aid substan-
tially in mitigation. With questions designed to spotlight major physi-
cal and mental disabilities,8 and a reminder of the statutory penalty for
wilful misrepresentation,9 this form may make evasion more difficult.
Success of similar forms employed by insurance companies gives sup-
port to this belief. Presently, the new Report Form is employed only
for Class III applicants.' 0 The authors recommend that Class I and
Class II forms be similarly renovated.
2 Stovall, Problem Areas in the Medical Program, op. cit., p. 3.
3 Stovall, supra, p. 4.
4 Ibid.
5 Interview, Dr. L. G. Lederer, Chief Medical Examiner, A.T.A., Dec. 27, 1956.
6 Ibid.
7 1bid.
8 See Appendix for copy of new Class III Report of Medical Examination.
9 Ibid. Note that the applicant is required to certify that he has answered all
questions to the best of his knowledge. Thus a double barreiled approach of better
questions plus sanctions for misrepresentation is utilized in an effort to force
disclosure.
10 Class I and Class II Report Forms presently in effect do not mention the
penalty for misrepresentation.
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2. Need for Trained Medical Examiners
No matter what kinds of report forms are used, nor how many
sanctions are employed, however, a thorough examination is largely
dependent upon the alertness and skill of the examining doctor. A
doctor who is unversed in aviation medicine tends to interpret the
physical standards on a purely clinical basis. One authority has stated,
"Since one of the principal tenets of clinical medicine is to
encourage a patient vocationally as an aid to his recovery, this may
be done at the expense of public safety, and the applicant may be
inappropriately issued a medical certificate.""
A sizeable body of trained examiners is therefore essential to the
Administrators' program.
As pointed out in Chapter I, "designated" medical examiners are
required only for Class I and Class II physicals. Class III applicants
may receive their examinations from any licensed physician.1 2 Fre-
quently a private pilot will shop around until he finds a doctor who
will certify him." The result may be serious, especially since undesig-
nated doctors tend to be unduly lenient to applicants.' 4 To remedy
this situation, it is suggested that highly trained designees be required
for all three classes. Since all examiners would be directly responsible
to the CAA, the Medical Division could maintain a higher degree of
surveillance than is now possible. Likewise, the quality of the exami-
nation would improve commensurately with the training and experi-
ence of the designee.
It must be noted, however, that exclusive use of designees would
accentuate the problem of the cost of a medical exam. Presently, the
fee is set by the doctors, the "going rate" being about $15.00, barring
unusual complications.' 5 Pilots often complain that these exams
amount to a considerable out-of-pocket expense.16 Under the suggested
plan, with emphasis on more extensive physical exams, it might be
difficult to retain even the $15.00 average. In addition, private pilots
might have to travel some distance in order to find a designee. Thus,
some thought should be given as to whether the federal government
should share part of the cost and stabilize the fee at a "reasonable"
level.
Finally, if the demand for qualified examiners is recognized, ade-
quate provision must be made for their proper education. Cooperation
from civilian universities can aid materially in this regard. Currently,
Ohio State University is offering courses in aviation medicine and
aviation physiology, as well as being the recipient of funds for a medical
residency in aviation.' 7 Harvard has within the past month been
11 Stovall, Medical Certification-Recertifeation Procedures, p. 5.
12 See p. 8, supra.
13 Stovall, supra, p. 4.
14d., p. 4.
1 See Chapter I, Note 28.
16 Interview, Dr. Stovall, Dec. 27, 1956.
17 Stovall, Problem Areas, p. 2.
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granted $250,000 for a Research Center for Aviation Health and Safety.
Part of this fund will be used to train physicians.' 8 U.C.L.A. also
expects to become active. 19 Although this is a good beginning, it only
scratches the surface. Other schools should be encouraged to partici-
pate. In place of the present informal approach, a government-planned
program should be initiated, which would coordinate the medical
research discussed in the previous chapter and examiner training into
an orderly, comprehensive scheme. Such a program is dependent upon
tangible, federal government support as well as aid from private
organizations. 20
STREAMLINING THE APPEAL PROCEDURE
In Chapter II, the current appeal procedure in cases of denial of
certification was outlined. It will be remembered that the pilot can
appeal first to the CAA, through the Regional Medical Officer to the
Chief of the Medical Division; then to the CAB, through a trial exam-
iner, then to the Board itself; and finally, at least technically, to a court
of competent jurisdiction.2' This procedure is unnecessarily cumber-
some. When two separate agencies are entrusted with appeal jurisdic-
tion, each interpreting physical standards regulations according to its
own philosophy, consistent application becomes almost impossible and
the effectiveness of the whole program suffers.
For example, the regulations require that the applicant have "no
organic or functional disease or structural defect which would interfere
with the safe piloting of aircraft. ' 22 The CAA regards any case of
diabetes as disqualifying under this standard because of the possibility
of sudden incapacitation.23 The CAB, on the other hand, interprets it
less strictly and has reversed the CAA upon proof that the diabetic
condition is one that can be controlled by diet.24 Similarly, the Board
appears to hold that an applicant need only meet the physical require-
ments at the time of his examination, compliance thereafter being his
own responsibility. The CAA Medical Division, on the other hand,
asserts that it is not practical to expect an applicant to keep close
medical surveillance of himself.25
Many of the present appeal problems would be minimized if the
proposals made in the last chapter were adopted. First, research would
lead to specific regulations in more areas of disability. Second, medical
representation in rule-promulgation would lead to more comprehensi-
ble standards. Third, if delegation of rule-making were made to the
18 See Chapter II, Note 1, supra.
19 Stovall, Problem Areas, p. 2.
20 Id., p. 5.
21 See p. 11, supra.
22 C.A.R. 29.2(c), 29.3(c), 29.4(c).
23 Interview, Dr. Stovall, Dec. 27, 1956.
24 Examples of such reversals are listed in a letter from William R. Smith,
M.D., Chief Flight Surgeon, State of Conn. to Senator William Purtell, May 12,
1954. This letter is printed in "Revision of the Civil Aeronautics Act," p. 1266.
25 Stovall, Certification and Recertification Procedures, op. cit., p. 7.
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CAA, the question of dual interpretation would be virtually elimi-
nated, since the functions of promulgation and enforcement would be
united in the same body. Even under maximum rule-making condi-
tions, however, some appeals would still be taken. Therefore, defects
in the current unwieldy appeal system should be cured.
As a solution, the authors suggest the creation of a three-man medi-
cal panel to hear and decide denial of certification cases. One doctor
would represent the rule-makers, one the pilot, and the third would
be chosen by the other two. If the CAB retained promulgation power,
it is recommended that this panel be substituted for the trial examiner.
In the last chapter it was proposed as one alternative that the CAB
have medical representation on its staff. These doctors would be logical
choices to represent the rule-makers on the panel. 26 Once a decision
is rendered by the panel it would be final except for appeal to a court
of competent jurisdiction.
If delegation to the CAA is effectuated, the panel would replace
the current complicated process of appealing from the Medical Divi-
sion to the CAB trial examiner, to the Board itself. The Regional
Flight Surgeon would be a good choice to represent the CAA, and the
other two members would be selected as above. Again, the decision of
the panel would be final, except for appeal to a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Were either of these alternatives accepted, the problem of dual
interpretation would be mitigated, and superfluous steps in the appeal
procdure would be eliminated. The result would be that promulga-
tion, enforcement, and judicial disposition of the administrative pro-
gram would be better coordinated. A more sensible balance between
maximum safety and the "right to fly" would result.
26 The authors suggest that it might be advisable for doctors who represent
the rule-maker on the panel to be licensed pilots. Personal experience would give
them first-hand knowledge of the demands of flying. The presence of such personnel
would also give applicants in certification controversies a feeling of security in
knowing that their interests are understood. The authors are not sure that such a
suggestion is practical, however.
